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The presence of personal financial data, intellectual property, and classified 
documents on University computer systems makes them particularly attractive to 
hackers, but not well prepared for their attacks. The University of Rhode Island (URI) 
is one of the few institutions collecting network traffic data (NetFlow) for inference and 
analysis of normal and potentially malicious activity. This research focuses on web-
based traffic with client-server architecture and adopts simple probability-based 
transmission models to explore the vulnerability of the URI web-network to anticipated 
threats. The fact that the URI firewall captures only traffic data in- and out- of URI 
necessitates the modeling of internal un-observed traffic. Relying on a set of intuitive 
assumptions, we simulate the spread of infection on the dynamic bipartite graph inferred 
from observed external and modeled unobserved internal web-browsing traffic and 
evaluate the susceptibility of URI nodes to threats initiated by random clients and clients 
from specific countries. Overall, the results suggest higher rates of infection for client 
nodes compared to servers with maximum rates achieved when infection is initiated 
randomly. Remarkably, very similar rates are observed when infection is initiated from 
100 different clients from each of selected countries (e.g., China, Germany, UK) or from 
one most active node from Denmark. Interestingly, the daily analysis over a three-month 
period reveals that the simulated infection rates that are not consistent with the intensity 
of the traffic and the pattern of network characteristics which are dependent on how the 
nodes are related in the network, such as assortativity and global clustering coefficient, 
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The Internet provides access to an enormous area of research and information, yet 
cyber-attacks and virus outbreaks can result in huge monetary losses and exposure of 
personal and confidential data. This raises a very concerning question, whether the 
Internet is an information-providing tool or computer infection hazard [1]. The era of 
the Internet of things (IoT) has brought devices that provide convenience in terms of 
communication and usage but pose an unnecessary risk to security and exposure of 
classified and personal information. According to cybersecurity statistics, 51% of US 
adults suffered some kind of security incident between Dec 1, 2015, and Dec 1, 2016 
[2]. Cyber-attacks and malware cause a substantial threat to the country’s security and 
economic development. New viruses evolve rapidly to counter the new methods of 
computer protection. Outbreaks like distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) result in 
interruption of a vast number of valid clients' access to planned services and control of 
their computer assets and activities. And worse, each new generation of outbreaks 
demonstrates increasing speed, virulence, and sophistication [1]. Network attacks are 
ascending in number with the development in transmission rates and network sizes. The 
global spending on information security products and services in 2016 was $81.6 billion, 
and estimated global cost of cyber-attacks annually was $400 billion [2].  
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The storage of student/faculty personal financial data, intellectual property, and 
some classified government documents on the computer systems of academic 
institutions makes them particularly attractive to hackers [5, 6]. Open networks, 
expansive volumes of data, scientific research results, and the flexibility of public access 
expose university computer systems to cyber threats that, unfortunately, come with 
consequences. For example, in May 2017, a strain of ransomware called ‘Wanna-Cry’ 
spread around the world, walloping millions of targets, including UK universities [10]. 
The University College London (UCL) reported that malware very likely passively 
spread from a ‘compromised’ website in the university system [14]. In July 2015, 
Harvard University announced a data breach that affected as many as eight of its 
colleges and administrative offices. At about the same time, the networks of six 
Japanese Universities came under simultaneous cyber-attacks [9]. In Mar 2016, the 
breach in the library of Concordia University, Canada potentially impacted anyone who 
had used the affected computers in the past year. Most of the recent cyber-attacks are 
web-based attacks. While there has been, some attention paid to the problem of web-
malware spread on institutional networks [7], very little research has been done to 
collect and analyze network flow data of a university computer system. This type of 
analysis could be a valuable tool to understand the communication patterns of web-
browsing participants (i.e., clients and servers) in this type of system, to learn the 
mechanisms by which epidemic spreads, to model the future course of epidemics in the 
context of existing threats on graphs with non-random structure, and possibly to alert a 
University’s IT staff of a potential intrusion. 
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Lately, trend of targeted attacks that originate from specific countries have been 
noticed. One such attack happened in October 2016, the webpage of Kerala University 
in India was attacked by hackers from Pakistan [9]. In May 2015, the web servers of the 
College of Engineering at Pennsylvania State University were targeted by two 
sophisticated cyber-attacks, suspected to have originated from China [9, 10]. In January 
2010, Google withdrew its search engine services from China and considered shutting 
down its operations altogether, citing assaults from Chinese hackers on proprietary code 
and information from Gmail accounts, aimed at source code repositories of high-tech 
companies [9].  
New web-based cyber threats evolve rapidly masking and hiding malicious code 
within regular communication activity [11]. The evolution of web-based malware has 
been facilitated to a large extent by the Web popularity, by the relative simplicity of the 
web-development, and by the way websites and users get infected. Provos et al. (2007) 
emphasize the importance of this rising threat and identify four prevalent mechanisms 
used to inject malicious content on popular web sites: web server security, user 
contributed content, advertising, and third-party widgets [4]. A single visit to a 
compromised website is sufficient for a user to get infected and for an attacker to detect 
and exploit a browser vulnerability. The compromised website, in turn, is used as a 
vehicle to infect any client who visits this page [8]. Further, compromised clients, 
unaware of their infection, can transmit the infection to other servers by visiting and 
uploading user content on websites stored on these servers. Most existing and soon-to-
be anticipated computer viruses spread passively among computers without any 
noticeable reaction from the system and/or end-user [7, 8, 11]. The dissemination 
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mechanisms of these ‘new’ infections depend on the type of application and the 
structure of the communication networks inherent in network systems under 
consideration [1, 12].  
To achieve an ability to control and prevent epidemic outbreak on the University 
of Rhode Island network, this study focuses on the analysis of web-browsing application 
activity using network flow data collected at the URI firewall in a period of 90 days 
from February to May of 2014 (Refer Section 2.1). The URI is one of the few academic 
institutions collecting network traffic (NetFlow) for inference and analysis of normal 
and potentially malicious activity. The fact that the URI firewall captures only traffic 
data in- and out- of URI brings the need for modeling of internal URI traffic and an 
additional layer of complexity of the proposed research. The modeling of internal traffic 
is based on simple intuitive assumptions that URI nodes (clients and servers) that are 
active externally are also active internally and the intensity of the internal activity is 
consistent over time with external activity. Specifically, we utilize the bipartite graph 
modeling approach proposed by Tarissan et al. for Internet topology networks [25]. This 
approach takes as input the node degree sequence for both layers and randomly 
generates a bipartite graph respecting those distributions. We adapt this approach to 
incorporate overall external activity of URI servers and clients (i.e., strength 
distribution) and the intensity of traffic over time thereby modeling a dynamic bipartite 
graph.    
To simulate malicious activity that can propagate from clients to servers and 
servers to clients in a dynamic manner, we combine both observed external traffic and 
modeled internal traffic and construct a dynamic bipartite network, which will serve as 
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a basis for SI propagation model similar to one described in [13]. We use the proposed 
simulation approach to evaluate susceptibility of URI nodes to threats initiated by 
random clients and clients from specific countries with the most vigorous 
communication with URI (e.g., China, UK). We perform simulations varying sets of 
parameters, number of iterations, observation periods. We employ parallel computing 
techniques to the speed up the simulation process.  
A central theme of this study includes the following goals: 
1. Developing a model of a network that captures the data traffic flowing into the 
university network. 
a. Preprocess the URI network flow data 
b. Generate an external web-traffic graph model with clients and servers 
as nodes and observed flows between theses node as edges. 
c. Build the URI internal traffic stochastically to understand flow of data 
within URI.  
d. Analyze the network characteristics of external, internal and combined 
network. 
2. Evaluating susceptibility of URI nodes to threats originated from various 
sources based on simulations, varying transmission parameters, number of 
iterations, and observation periods. 
a. Evaluate daily the fraction of infected servers, clients, URI servers and 
URI clients when infection is initiated from various sources.  
b. Understand the pattern of fraction of infected nodes over time to predict 
the possibility of intrusion. 
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1.2 RELATED WORK 
Network Flow data are records that represent aggregated traffic between two hosts. 
The information saved in a network flow record includes the IP address and port 
numbers of the source and destination, the protocol type of the traffic, the volume of 
traffic sent and various other attributes. The data is collected at a granularity that is 
optimal for tools that aim to enhance network security or provide network situational 
awareness [16]. General properties of network traffic have been studied intensely for 
many years [12,13,14,15,16,18]. The majority of these traffic analysis studies have been 
focused on the packet level, IP flow, protocol information and end-to-end behavior for 
detection of anomalies. The Virginia Tech, Blacksburg University collected network 
flow data to perform research on malware propagation, but their research was based on 
ring-based flow model involving packet and flow data [18]. The IP-flow level of 
clustering of anomalies of similar behavior [13] was performed by researchers at 
University of Wisconsin to show that anomalies can be exposed effectively when 
aggregated with a large amount of additional traffic.  In [15], numbers of IP-flow, bytes 
and packets based analysis were employed to detect anomalies.  
Rather than becoming over-whelmed by trying to examine each packet that 
traverses the network, in our study, we look at higher-level trends of traffic flow across 
the network. These trends can reveal interesting patterns and provide enough 
information to be useful that may otherwise be “lost in the noise” if we try to examine 
raw packet traces. Several analytical papers presented their work on creating 
visualization tools, which can depict a wide range of information about the 
characteristics of an entire network on a single screen [16, 17]. Though we involve 
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identifying network characteristics in this study, our focus is mainly on evaluating 
fraction of infection over time using simulated epidemic spread on the bipartite network 
graph.  
Epidemic modeling on graphs has been an area of intense interest among 
researchers working on network-based dynamic process models. Epidemic modeling is 
concerned with three primary issues: (i) understanding the mechanisms by which 
epidemics spread, (ii) predicting the future course of epidemics, and (iii) achieving an 
ability to control the spread of epidemics [23]. Below we provide a brief overview of 
results for a traditional epidemiological model, followed by analogous models that have 
emerged in the literature on network-based extensions. 
Traditional epidemiological models are based on the assumption of population 
wide random-mixing; that is, each individual has a small and equal chance of coming 
into contact with any other individual. In practice, however, each individual has a finite 
set of contacts to whom they can pass infection. The ensemble of all such contacts forms 
a ‘mixing network’. Models that incorporate network structure avoid the random-
mixing assumption by assigning to each individual a finite set of permanent contacts to 
whom they can transmit infection and from whom they can be infected. [24].  
The most commonly used class of continuous-time epidemic models is the class of 
susceptible-infected (SI) or susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) models. A population 
of N individuals is divided into three states: susceptible (S), infective (I), and removed 
(R). In this context “removed” means individuals who are either recovered from the 
disease and immune to further infection, or dead [19]. The model states that, at any 
given time t, a new infective will emerge from among the susceptibles (due to contact 
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with and infection by one of the infected individuals) with instantaneous probability 
proportional to the product of the number of susceptibles s and the number of infected 
i. Similarly, infected individuals recover with instantaneous probability proportional to 
i. These probabilities are scaled by the parameters β and γ, usually referred to as the 
infection and recovery rates, respectively. The product form for the probability with 
which infected emerge corresponds to an assumption of ‘homogeneous mixing’ among 
members of the population, which asserts that the population is (i) homogeneous and 
(ii) well mixed, in the sense all individuals have approximately the same number of 
contacts in the same time, and that all contacts transmit the infection with the same 
probability.  
The underlying assumption of homogeneous mixing is admittedly simple and, for 
many epidemic processes, too poor of an approximation to reality. As a result, interest 
has turned increasingly towards ‘structured population’ models, in which assumed 
contact patterns take into account some structure(s) within the population of interest 
[19, 23]. Models introduced in this area include independent household models, two-
level mixing models, random network models, and social clustering models. The end 
effect of all of these models is, in one way or another, to impose restrictions on the 
contact structure within the population. Often it is convenient to represent this structure 
as a graph G = (V, E), where the vertices i ∈ V represent elements of the population 
and edges {i, j} ∈ E indicate contact between elements i and j. The contact implies the 
possibility for infection. The lack of an edge between vertices indicates that no infection 
is possible between the two [23].  
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Web-based communication networks are built on client-server architecture and 
follow a bipartite graph structure with two sets of nodes and edges that only exist 
between nodes of the different types. Epidemic behavior usually shows a phase 
transition with the parameters of the model—a sudden transition from a regime without 
epidemics to one with. Many of the really interesting cases of epidemic spreading take 
place on networks that have more structure like bipartite networks [19]. The study [21] 
represents the spread of sexually transmitted diseases in heterosexual populations and 
showed that the bipartite nature of the network must be taken into account to model the 
behavior of the epidemic threshold. Specifically, Gomez-Gardenes et.al. demonstrates 
that the inclusion of the bipartite structure can strongly affect the epidemic outbreak and 
can lead to an increase of the epidemic threshold. The results also point out that the 
larger the population, the greater the gap between the epidemic thresholds predicted. 
Another study [22] on Vector-borne diseases for which transmission occurs exclusively 
between vectors and hosts is modeled on a bipartite network. The study states that 
spreading of the disease strongly depends on the degree distribution of the two classes 
of nodes. This study also suggests that the present approach is generalizable to other 
models. Modeling the epidemics of malware within networks in close to real-time, 
however, still remains a fundamentally open task due to diverse networks and constantly 
changing attack patterns [18]. The above-mentioned studies serve as effective 
foundational methods to build an epidemiological model based on a bipartite network. 
Specifically, we utilize the bipartite graph modeling approach proposed by Tarissan et 
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DATA REPRESENTATION AND CHARACTERIZATION 
 
2.1 DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this study, we analyze URI network flow datasets. The University of Rhode 
Island (URI) cyber system produces massive amounts of data on a daily basis. The log 
data produced by this system offers important information about the communication 
activity, resilience and overall ‘health’ of the URI network. The University is mainly 
collecting network traffic for inference and analysis of normal and potentially malicious 
behaviors. The URI network flow data captures only data flow in and out of the URI 
firewall. Therefore, we do not have any information about the flow of data between 
nodes within the URI network. This brings the need to simulate internal data flows at 
URI stochastically, to construct an internal network model. The datasets are relational 
and gathered from URI cyber security network between February and May 2014.  
The University has deployed NetFlow monitoring systems on its routers for both 
wireless and wired traffic flows. In wireless data, the IP addresses of URI nodes are 
assigned dynamically by the system from a small range of addresses and typically the 
exact machine location remains unknown. In order to the maintain coherence with each 
machine location and unique IP address for each machine, we consider only wired data 
in this study. The network flow data sets are comprised of 37 features such as Source IP 
address (srcIP), Destination IP address (dstIP), IP protocol (pro), Source port (srcPort), 
Destination port (dstPort), Time Recorded (time), Bytes Sent (bytes), Packets Sent 
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(packets), Country of Source (srcCountry), Country of Destination (dstCountry), 
Application (application) and Department (department – for URI only) in CSV (comma-
separated values) format. In this study, we only utilize the following features: time, 
srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, application, srcCountry, and dstCountry. 
 
2.2 CLIENT - SERVER ARCHITECTURE 
         This study focuses on the analysis of web-based traffic using a Client - Server 
Architecture. To comprehend clients and servers: (a) Clients are personal computers on 
which users run applications. (b) Servers are powerful machines that provide multiple 
clients with data/services upon browser-generated requests. There is a fundamental 
difference how clients and servers get infected [7].  
Clients get to be distinctly infected when they visit a compromised site. 
Depending upon the infection classification, the injected malware frequently empowers 
an attacker to gain remote control over the compromised computer system and can be 
utilized to steal sensitive information, for example, individual documentation, email 
passwords and banking accounts. A compromised client, ignorant of its infection, will 
have the capacity to transmit infections to multiple servers by means of web pages stored 
on these servers and accessed by client. 
Servers get infected when malicious content is injected into websites stored on 
this server through web server security vulnerabilities in the operating system or in-
stalled software, user contributed content (e.g., blogs, uploads), advertising (images, 
banners) and third-party content (widgets, scripts). Once infected, servers transform into 
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storage for websites where some portion of the websites is infected with malware.  
Once the client or server is infected, the adversaries can even take control over 
the personal computer or server network. The key strokes and other confidential 
transactions on the compromised system are at risk from being observed by remote 
adversaries. The sophistication of adversaries has increased over time and exploits are 
becoming increasingly more complicated and difficult to analyze [7]. 
 
2.3 GRAPH-BASED REPRESENTATION  
As the network flow data is relational in nature, it can be represented with a graph 
model. This representation will recognize attributes and examples of normal and 
anomalous patterns. The standard bipartite graph model is used to demonstrate 
noteworthy network characteristics and depict the Client - Server architecture. 
The network graph is delineated with clients and servers as nodes and edges are 
connection between them. Formally, a bipartite network is a graph G = (V, E), such that 
the vertex set V may be partitioned into two disjoint sets, say V1 as servers S = {S1, ..., 
SN} and V2 as clients C = {C1, ..., CN} and each edge in E has one endpoint in S and the 
other in C [3].   
We considered two types of bipartite graph models in our analysis: Static and 
Dynamic. In Static graph Gs edges, E= {e (Si, Cj), i, j}, reﬂect presence or absence of 
communication between Si and Cj over infection period. Whereas in Dynamic graph Gd 
edges, E = {e (Si, Cj, tk),i,j,k} reﬂect one or multiple temporal communications between 
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Si and Cj overtime tk [1].  
 
Figure 1: Static and Dynamic Bipartite networks. Servers (Orange) and Clients (blue) 
 
 
In the static network represented in Figure 1, all the clients from UK, India and 
NYC US are connected to URI Server S1 without time taken component into 
consideration. The static bipartite graph representation will be used to characterize the 
daily traffic in terms of graph structure. The dynamic network graph takes time into 
consideration and though clients C1 from UK and C2 from India are connected to server 
S1, they are represented separately at different time t1 and t3. We use the dynamic graph 
to simulate the network and virus propagation in this paper.  
 
2.4 DATA PRE-PROCESSING 
For web-browsing applications, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), a 
department of ICANN, assigned port number 80 as the official port for HTTP (www) 
and port number 443 as official port for HTTPS. The IP addresses with port number as 
80 or 443 are classified as servers and respectively other IP addresses are classified as 
clients. After pre-processing of the 90-day dataset, we identify the average number of 
unique flows per day as 36,459. The pre-processing steps involve selecting only flows 
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using web-browsing, categorizing IP addresses as servers based on port numbers 80 and 
443, and other IP addresses as clients respectively.  
The data collection started from 02/10/2014 to 04/22/2014, stopped between 
04/23/2014 to 05/06/2014 and resumed from 05/07/2014 to 05/28/2014. During the time 
period between 4/23/2014 to 5/6/2014, the URI network was claimed to be under real 
cyber-attack explaining why data was not collected during this period. Graphical 
representation of the data traffic per day shown in Figure 2 depicts total number of data 
flows per day over the period of 90-days. The fall in traffic intensity between 
03/10/2014 to 03/14/2014 can be explained due to spring break week at the university. 
We can see the activity of nodes dropping down during the weekends and raising back 
during the mid-week. This provides some insight into the expected patterns of traffic on 
the university network.   
 





 Furthermore, the URI servers and clients are classified based on IP addresses 
using the following mask: ‘131.128.X.X’. The total number of unique URI servers and 
clients in the period of 90-days is 843 and 7215 respectively. Figure 3 represents daily 
percentage of activity of URI servers and clients. The daily percentage is calculated as 
percentage of unique nodes per day to total number of unique days over the period of 
90-days.  
 
Figure 3: Daily Percentage of Activity of URI Servers and Clients  
 
   While cyber-attacks and malware can originate from any place, some countries 
are predominant in initiating such attacks. In May 2015, the web servers of the College 
of Engineering at Pennsylvania State University were targeted by two sophisticated 
cyber-attacks, suspected to have originated from China [2]. In order to consider the 
influence of specific countries on the flow of data in the URI network, we examined 
data from a subset of the days in the data set.  In this sample day 02-12-2014 and sample 
week between 02-10-2014 to 02-16-2014, we found that countries like Canada, China, 
India, Denmark, Germany and UK are predominantly influential with more than 100 
active clients and servers interacting with the URI network per day. The choice of the 
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day is based on the high volume of traffic expected in the middle of the week during 
regular school time. The high number of flows from these countries could be explained 
by the significant number of students from China at URI and by URI’s collaboration 
with universities at Germany and UK. The column 1 in Table 1 depicts unique number 
of clients from various countries. The column 2 and 3 depict the total number of data 
flows which involve URI servers and clients from various countries. Firstly, the total 
number of unique clients from China are 217. These clients were involved in 417 data 
flows per day. When we look at a week, 2648 data flows represent consistent activity 
over the week. Similarly, clients from UK, Canada and India show consistent high 
activity. 
There are certain cases of special notice, such as, Denmark had involvement in 
1193 data flows with only 6 unique clients on 02-12-2014. This level of activity might 
raise an alarm for attention by the IT department because Denmark had less than 20 data 
flows per day for the rest of the week. As we dig further, Denmark client “93.160.60.22” 
accessed 39 unique number of URI servers, which included accessing “131.128.1.19 -  
uri.edu” more than 500 times, “131.128.1.130 - web.uri.edu” more than 200 times. 
Table 1 shows these countries and the total number of active servers and clients and the 




# Data Flows Active 
Servers 
(1 day) 
# Data Flows 
1 day 1 week 1 day 1 week 
China 217 417 2648 402 985 4081 
UK 249 301 1909 193 630 2641 
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Canada 158 200 1409 122 272 1637 
India 215 250 1316 3 3 111 
Germany 76 132 847 91 158 711 
Denmark 6 1193 1679 7 7 68 
Russia 44 61 466 53 63 237 
 
Table 1: Number of Active Nodes (per day & per week) of Most Influential Countries on URI network. 
 
2.5 NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
Examining the simulated data through a bipartite network identifies some network 
characteristics that are useful to understand the distribution of nodes in the network and 
eventually influence the infection spread on the network. Graph partitioning methods 
are useful precisely because these characteristics will often be unobserved [3]. The 
presence of high-risk nodes can be quantified through two network topology features, 
degree assortativity and clustering coefficient.  
Degree of Bipartite Graph Nodes represents the number of connections from a 
source node to the destination nodes [3]. The degree provides a good picture of 
connectivity of the clients and servers and when a node with high degree is infected, 
chances of infection propagation increases and all the nodes attached to it are highly 
susceptible. 
Assortativity of Bipartite Graph (r) is the correlation between the network nodes. 
In general, r lies between −1 and 1. Positive values of r indicate a correlation between 
nodes of similar degree, while negative values indicate relationships between nodes of 
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different degree [3]. If the network has a negative value, it shows that high degree nodes 
tend to attach to low degree nodes. For example, in social network, nodes tend to be 
connected with other nodes with similar degree values. This tendency is referred to as 
assortative mixing. On the other hand, technological and biological networks typically 
show disassortative mixing, as high degree nodes tend to attach to low degree nodes [4].   
Bipartite Projection is a widely-used method for compressing information about 
bipartite networks. Bipartite networks are a particular class of complex networks, whose 
nodes are divided into two sets X and Y, and only connections between two nodes in 
different sets are allowed. For the convenience of directly showing the relation structure 
among a particular set of nodes, bipartite networks are usually compressed by one-mode 
projection [5]. Speciﬁcally, a graph G1 = (V1, E1) may be deﬁned on the vertex set V1 
by assigning an edge to any pair of vertices that both have edges in E to at least one 
common vertex in V2. Similarly, a graph G2 may be deﬁned on V2. Each of these graphs 
is called a projection onto its corresponding vertex subset [3]. If nodes ‘a’ and ‘b’ share 
at least one common destination, they are connected in the bipartite network projection. 
In Figure 4, example of a small bipartite graph with clients and servers is presented on 
the left panel and its two one-mode projections on the right panel. The projection is used 




   
Figure 4: Example of Bipartite Graph (left) and its projections (right).  
 
Clustering coefficient of Projection Graph is a measure of the degree to which 
nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. The value of the coefficient lies between 0 and 
1 [3]. If the network is highly clustered with coefficient value close to 1, the network 
forms more connected communities which tend to connect to same node with high 
density ties. When they form community, all the nodes irrespective of their degree are 
susceptible to infection. The global clustering coefficient is defined as: 
𝐶𝑛 =
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑛 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑛 
 
In this formula, the number of triangles or a connected triple is defined to be a 
connected subgraph consisting of three vertices and two edges. Thus, each triangle 
forms three connected triplets, explaining the factor of three in the formula. Intuitively, 
a measure of the frequency with which connected triples ‘close’ to form triangles will 
provide some indication of the extent to which edges are ‘clustered’ in the graph. The 
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3.1 SIMULATION OF INTERNAL NETWORK 
The construction of an internal URI network is a new idea to understand the 
vulnerability of internal URI nodes to anonymous attacks coming in from various nodes 
outside the network and spreading within URI. The structure of unobserved internal 
network traffic will mimic main characteristics of the external (observed) URI network 
traffic. The simulation of the internal network flow adheres to the client-server 
architectural framework of the real-time URI network flow. Our main modeling 
assumptions are the following: URI nodes (clients and servers) that are active externally 
are also active internally and the intensity of the internal activity is consistent over time 
with external activity, on a particular day. 
We adopt a bipartite graph model to form a URI internal data frame with the 
URI client IPs, URI server IPs, and timestamps randomly selected from the external 
traffic features. Specifically, we model a dynamic graph ?̃?𝑑 = (?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?𝑑), where each 
edge in the set ?̃?𝑑 reﬂects one communication between URI server ?̃?𝑖 and URI client ?̃?𝑗 
that occurred at time ?̃?𝑘 from observation time period T, i.e., ?̃?𝑑  =  {𝑒 (?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑗 , ?̃?𝑘), ?̃?𝑘 ∈
𝑇, 𝑘 = 1 … 𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠}.  For each triple (?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑗 , ?̃?𝑘), we select randomly: 
1. with replacement server ?̃?𝑖 from a set of unique, active URI servers 𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐼 ⊂ 𝑆 
proportionally to the strength of flows observed in the external traffic for ?̃?𝑖; 
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2. with replacement client ?̃?𝑗 from a set of unique, active URI clients 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼 ⊂ 𝐶 
proportionally to the strength of flows observed in the external traffic for ?̃?𝑗; 
3. without replacement timestamp ?̃?𝑘 from a set of timestamps recorded in the 
external traffic.  
To ensure the uniqueness of ?̃?𝑘s, we add 0.5 seconds of each selected time. The sets 
of all unique selected servers and clients form sets ?̃? and ?̃? respectively. Note that the 
proposed approach produces a dynamic bipartite graph that preserves important 
properties of the observed external graph structure. The size of the internal network is 
generated based on a specified percentage of the size of the external network, where 
size is the number of data flows in the network. We simulate internal networks with 
three different sizes - 10%, 25% and 50% of the size of the external network and refer 
to each internal network based on its size in comparison. In order to maintain consistent 
results, we first build the 50% internal network and form the 25% internal network from 
the 50% internal network. Similarly, the 10% internal network is formed from the 25% 
internal network. Based on the understanding of how a university network is typically 
used, we expect to observe more external web traffic data than internal data. This 
assumption, however, may not be valid for other organizations such as the banking 
sector where external communication is limited or restricted.  
Figure 5 depicts external network with URI and Non-URI nodes and internal 
network with URI nodes are combined and sorted based on the time variable (t).  
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Figure 5: Network Simulation of Combined Network with External and Internal data flows. Servers 
(blue) and Clients (orange), URI (square) and Non-URI (circle) 
 
3.2 EPIDEMIC MODELING  
In this section, we describe the epidemic modeling by assuming a set of clients 
Ci, i ∈ {1,2, … , NC}  and a set of servers Si, i ∈ {1,2, … , NS} with the corresponding 
probabilities of infection and susceptibility: 
αS(i) = P(Si infected), βS(i) = P(Si susceptible) 
αC(j) = P(Cj infected), βC(j) = P(Cj susceptible), 
And the transmission probabilities computed as follows: 
     pCS(i, j) = P(Ci → Sj) = αC(i) × βS(j) I{Ci infected}, 
pSC(j, i) = P(Sj → Ci) = αS(j) × βc(i) I{Si infected}. 




















In what follows in Section 4, we have adopted the outlined probability-based 
transmission model to simulate the propagation of computer virus on the dynamic 
bipartite graphs constructed based on external traffic and combined external and internal 
traffic. We consider the same transmission probability of infection for all servers and 
clients, 𝑝𝐶𝑆  =  𝑝𝑆𝐶  =  𝑝, with values set up to 0.1, 0.3 or 0.5. We perform experiments 
with 100 initially infected clients that are either randomly selected from a pool of all 
unique clients, only URI unique clients, or unique active clients from a specified 
country. The simulation results are summarized with the proportion of infected clients, 
servers, URI clients, and URI servers. The proportions of infected nodes are estimated 
for one day, one week, and daily over 90 days. In Figure 6 (right panel), example of 
simulation results is presented with the proportion of infected clients estimated for one 
day when P = 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. To optimize the code and achieve high-speed 
performance, we used parallel computing method (Refer Section 3.3) to simulate 
propagation of infection for each value of p and different conditions of initial 
propagation. We let infection be transmitted from clients to servers and from servers to 
clients via communication flows ordered in time; thereby analyzing propagation of a 
simulated infection via nodes communicating directly and/or indirectly via common 
(overlapping) sets of nodes of different type.  
In Figure 6, infection is initially introduced into the network from clients C1 and 
C2, the infection spreads to server S3 as its level of infection is less than P value. The 
server S1 is not infected as its level of infection is higher than P value. Also, in the final 
data flow, the infected server S3 infects client C3 as level of infection of C3 is lower 
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than P value. Therefore, the infection spread and propagation is analyzed with the client 
connection directly to servers and indirectly to other clients from connected servers. 
    
Figure 6: Epidemic Infection Propagation (left) with Clients (squares) and Servers (circles). Infected 
nodes (red) and Non-infected nodes (green). Example of simulation results over a day (right) with the 
proportion of infected clients when P = 0.1 (blue), 0.3 (green) and 0.5 (red). 
 
3.3 PARALLEL COMPUTING 
Parallel computing is a type of computation in which many calculations or processes 
can be carried out simultaneously. Large problems can often be divided into smaller 
ones, which can then be solved at the same time using multiple processors [1]. As we 
have considered more than one probability of infection (P = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5) in the study, 
we have used parallel computing to compute infection propagation for each value of P. 
This saves computation time and optimizes the code. In Figure 7, the graph presents the 
computation time taken using different numbers of cores. The sequential computation 
with function lapply takes less time than for loop. The best result of 9.093 mins is 
achieved using 4 cores on a i5 quad core computer system.  Nearly 600% speed up is 
achieved using parallel computing methods and packages in R: doParallel package, 
foreach, lapply and mclappy functions. 
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lapply is a way to parallelize but tasks are embarrassingly parallel, where elements 
are calculated independently. First element and second element are independent of each 
other's results. In parallel package, mclapply is used instead of lapply, where number of 
clusters are mentioned. It returns a list of the same length as vector (atomic or list), each 
element of which is the result of applying function to the corresponding element of the 
vector [1]. The idea behind the foreach package provides a looping construct that can 
be viewed as a hybrid of the standard for-loop and lapply function. It looks similar to 
the for-loop, and it evaluates an expression, rather than a function (like in lapply) and 
returns a value, rather than to cause side-effects. The %do% and %dopar% are binary 
operators that operate on a foreach object and an R expression. The %do% evaluates the 
expression sequentially, while %dopar% evaluates it in parallel. We must register a 
parallel backend to use; else foreach will execute tasks sequentially, even when the 
%dopar% operator is used. The doParallel package is a “parallel backend” for the 
foreach package [2]. It provides a mechanism needed to execute foreach loops in 
parallel. The doParallel package acts as an interface between foreach and the parallel 
package of R. The registerDoParallel function should be called to register doParallel 





Figure 7: Parallel Computation: Number of Cores Vs Time taken in minutes. 
 
 
List of References 
[1] K Gordon, Max, “How to go parallel in R,” G-Forge, Feb 2015. 
[2] Weston, Steve and Calaway, Rich, “Getting Started with doParallel and 








We address three types of results in this section: Graph-Based Characterization, 
Propagation of Infection, Effects of Time and Network Characteristics over Time. 
 
4.1 GRAPH-BASED CHARACTERIZATION 
This section starts with the structural characteristics of internal, external and 
combined networks formed from the network flow data over one day, Wednesday, 02-
12-2014. The choice of the day is based on the high volume of traffic expected in the 
middle of the week during regular school time. Using the data, we form three networks 
(internal, external and combined) and compute structural graph characteristics (see 
Table 2).  
The number of unique clients and servers in each network type (e.g., external 
and combined) gives us an idea of how many nodes of each type are active and the 
number of data flows determines the size of the network and the total number of 
connections. The strength of clients and servers determines the connectivity in terms of 
the average number of connections observed/modeled for clients and servers. In the case 
of the internal network, the strength of servers is higher than clients since more clients 
connect to fewer servers. In the external and combined networks (see Table 2), the 
strength of servers and clients is similar, as there are almost the same number of servers 
and clients. The presence of high-risk nodes can be quantified through two network 
 32 
 
topology characteristics such as degree assortativity and clustering coefficient. The 
degree assortativity measures the likelihood that nodes will preferentially form unique 
connections with other nodes that have similar degree distributions. Negative the 
assortativity degree of all the net-works, particularly in the case of internal networks; 
suggests that there is high chance of more popular nodes connecting to less active nodes. 
The values of clustering coefficient obtained from the projection graphs above 0.5 and 
close to 1 indicate that presence of clustered communities of clients that share common 
servers that they connect to; and clustered communities of servers that tend to be 
connected by the same clients. Overall, these results suggest that all the nodes in the 
















#Unique (C) 1954 2553 2858 12264 12264 12264 12264 
#Unique (S)  117 161 178 10713  10713 10713 10713 
#Flows 8743 21858 43716 87433 96176 109291 131149 
Strength (C) 4.474 8.562 15.29 7.129 7.842 8.9115 10.694 
Strength (S)  74.73 135.7 245.5 8.161 8.977 10.202 12.242 
Assortativity -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.083 -0.094 -0.115 -0.150 
Clustering (S) 0.717 0.698 0.629 0.756 0.725 0.699 0.673 
Clustering (C) 0.932 0.892 0.931 0.961 0.890 0.872 0.858 
 
Table 2: Network Characteristics of Internal, External and Combined (10%, 25%, 50%) network. 
The log-log plot of node degree distribution for URI clients, URI servers (Figure 
8, left and right top panels) and cumulative node degree distribution of servers and 
clients combined (Figure 8, left bottom panel) demonstrate heavy-tail distribution 
property also supporting the presence of few highly active nodes in the network. The 
histogram (Figure 8, right bottom panel) shows the intensity of the traffic computed as 
frequency of the flows in a given time slot during the day. One can see that peaks hours 
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of activity are during the working hours between 8:00 AM to 5:30 PM. 
 
Figure 8: Log-log plot of URI clients (left top), URI servers (right top), cumulative node strength 
distribution (left bottom) and Histogram (right bottom) for external network. 
 
4.2 PROPAGATION OF INFECTION 
In this section, we describe several experiments that explore the rate of infection 
of nodes to understand infection spread on the networks. To conduct these experiments, 
we consider the following networks: (1) only external network derived from network 
flow data, (2) only internal network with different percentage of total flows 10%, 25% 
and 50%, (3) combined network with external network and 10% internal network. The 
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rate of infection is calculated for each probability transmission (𝑝) value set up equal to 
0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. We initiated the infection with 100 randomly selected clients from the 
list of: (1) all unique clients, (2) unique URI clients, (3) unique clients from Canada, (4) 
unique clients from China, (5) unique clients from India and (6) unique clients from 
UK. To address a special case of unusual activity coming from Denmark, we also initiate 
the infection from a single node. 
In case of the external network, URI clients are not connected to URI servers 
directly resulting in some unrealistic zero rates of infection (Table 4, first three 
columns). Specifically, when infection propagation is initiated from the URI clients, 
none of the URI servers are infected. Similarly, when infection starts with clients from 
different countries (outside of URI), URI clients are not affected. These results are 
unrealistic clearly supporting the need for the collection of real internal communication 
traffic in order to analyze the health of the university network overall.  
When we initially infect the network with 100 clients from each of the five 
countries mentioned in Table 4, the rates of infection for all types of nodes are almost 
equal with expected variability less than 5%. We started the experiment with the 
hypothesis that initiating infection with 100 clients of countries with history of attacks 
would target more important URI nodes and promote the spread of infection, whereas 
infection initiation with 100 random clients would not target any particular node of 
interest. The results summarized in Table 4 for India, China, and UK clearly do not 
support this hypothesis. Overall, the results demonstrate the higher rates of infection for 
client nodes compared to servers with maximum rates achieved when infection initiated 
from random nodes. At the same time, the results show that very similar rates when 
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infection is initiated from 100 different clients from each of selected countries (e.g., 
China, UK) and from one most active node from Denmark. In the further experiments, 
we plan to investigate the infection rates when propagation starts with most/least active 
clients/servers and also vary the number/proportion of nodes to start with.  
 
Experiments initiated with  
100 URI Clients on 
Fraction of 
Infected 
P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 
 
10% Internal Network  URI Servers 0.1957 0.3424 0.4239 
 URI Clients 0.1601 0.3326 0.4484 
25% Internal Network URI Servers 0.3369 0.5326 0.6087 
 URI Clients 0.3035 0.5330 0.6491 
50% Internal Network  URI Servers 0.4674 0.7283 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4497 0.6770 0.7687 
 
Table 3: Fraction of Infected Nodes Computed on Internal Networks (10%, 25% & 50%) for Different 
Transmission Rates (p = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) 
Experiments  Fraction of 
Infected 
      External Network  Combined Network (Ex+10% Int) 
  P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 
Random Clients Servers 0.1430 0.3989 0.5887 0.1698 0.4365 0.6226 
  Clients 0.1648 0.4193 0.5909 0.2127 0.4618 0.6394 
 URI Servers 0.1576 0.2283 0.2663 0.2391 0.3804 0.4728 
 URI Clients 0.3444 0.6813 0.8055 0.4134 0.7231 0.8386 
URI Clients Servers 0.1423 0.4006 0.5817 0.1731 0.4353 0.6228 
 Clients 0.0908 0.1807 0.2118 0.2116 0.4604 0.6402 
 URI Servers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2446 0.3750 0.4674 
 URI Clients 0.3450 0.6863 0.8046 0.4144 0.7225 0.8386 
Canada Clients Servers 0.0029 0.0039 0.0049 0.1425 0.4187 0.6178 
 Clients 0.0866 0.2437 0.3816 0.1844 0.4415 0.6316 
 URI Servers 0.1685 0.2283 0.2880 0.2228 0.3478 0.4620 
 URI Clients 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3490 0.7095 0.8356 
China Clients Servers 0.0028 0.0041 0.0049 0.1564 0.4250 0.6181 
 Clients 0.0945 0.2476 0.3804 0.1997 0.4536 0.6332 
 URI Servers 0.1630 0.2391 0.2880 0.2337 0.3641 0.4674 
 URI Clients 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3784 0.7160 0.8356 
India Clients Servers 0.0030 0.0039 0.0048 0.1612 0.4299 0.6199 
 Clients 0.0976 0.2548 0.3910 0.2105 0.4658 0.6412 
 URI Servers 0.1739 0.2283 0.2772 0.2283 0.3641 0.4620 
 URI Clients 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3893 0.7185 0.8377 












Table 4: Fraction of Infected Nodes Computed on Network inferred from External Traffic and 
Combined External and Internal Traffic (10%) for Different Transmission Rates (p = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) 
 
 
We have also conducted experiments on combined network by infecting 100 
randomly selected servers from the list of: (1) all unique servers and (2) unique URI 
servers sampled from total number of servers. The Table 5 presents the results of rates 
of infection. When we compare results in Table 4 and Table 5, the higher rates of 
infection are achieved when infection initiated from client nodes compared to servers. 
These results are clearly unrealistic, so we conducted further rate analysis experiments 
with client initiated infection. 
Experiments 
 
Fraction of Infected P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 
 
Random Servers Servers 0.1447 0.4285 0.6189 
 Clients 0.1797 0.4398 0.6002 
 URI Servers 0.2283 0.4130 0.8191 
 URI Clients 0.3404 0.7055 0.8191 
URI Servers Servers 0.1761 0.4395 0.6301 
 Clients 0.2147 0.4706 0.6455 
 URI Servers 0.6359 0.7554 0.7717 
 URI Clients 0.4066 0.8315 0.7179 
 
Table 5: Fraction of Infected Nodes Computed on Combined Network for Different Transmission Rates 
(p = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) when infection initiated with 100 Servers. 
 
While Table 4 estimates presented for a single iteration of propagation, we have 
also analyzed the variation of our estimates in the network when infection propagation 
is simulated over 100 iterations on the external and combined networks. The resulting 
 Clients 0.0874 0.2320 0.3803 0.1685 0.4427 0.6226 
 URI Servers 0.1630 0.2228 0.2772 0.2011 0.3478 0.4511 
 URI Clients 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3112 0.7095 0.8318 
Denmark Client Servers 0.0027 0.0041 0.0051 0.1500 0.4336 0.6197 
 Clients 0.0845 0.2358 0.3733 0.1984 0.4598 0.6259 
 URI Servers 0.1576 0.2391 0.2989 0.2446 0.4402 0.5435 
 URI Clients 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3812 0.7135 0.8309 
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rates of infection on one fixed internal network estimated over multiple iterations with 
p = 0.1 showed less than 1% of variability for servers and clients and less than 2% of 
variability for URI servers and URI clients, respectively. Mean and Standard Deviation 
of rates of infection on combined network are presented in Table 6. We observed 
comparable variability when conducted analysis on combined network with external 









Table 6: Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of fraction of infected nodes on Combined 
Network with external and 10% internal traffic for p=0.1. 
 
We have also performed analysis on combined networks with (1) external and 
25% internal network and (2) external and 50% internal network. However, we did not 
see any abnormality in the results (shown in Table 7) and hence chose to consider 10% 
internal traffic to perform analysis on propagation of infection over time in Section 4.3. 
 
Fraction of Infected 100 Random Clients 100 URI Clients 
Servers 0.1542 (0.009) 0.1575 (0.004) 
Clients 0.2007 (0.010) 0.2026 (0.005) 
URI Servers 0.2518 (0.018) 0.2443 (0.019) 




Table 7: Fraction of Infected Nodes Computed on Network inferred from Combined External and 
Internal Traffic (25% and 50%) for Different Transmission Rates (p = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) 
 
 
4.3 EFFECTS OF TIME 
 In this section, we compute rates of infection over a period of time. In the quest to 
understand how rates of infection change over time, we conduct experiments using the 
90-day data. Firstly, the graphs in Figure 9 depict the analysis of the dataset over the 
Experiments  Fraction of 
Infected 
Combined Network (Ex+25% In)  Combined Network (Ex+50% Int) 
  P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 P=0.1 P=0.3 P=0.5 
Random Clients Servers 0.1906 0.4566 0.6406 0.2105 0.4725 0.6535 
  Clients 0.2333 0.4772 0.6518 0.2582 0.4919 0.6617 
 URI Servers 0.3696 0.5543 0.6304 0.4783 0.7391 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4809 0.7618 0.8687 0.5670 0.8064 0.8950 
URI Clients Servers 0.1929 0.4571 0.6404 0.2114 0.4729 0.6534 
 Clients 0.2342 0.4763 0.6520 0.2574 0.4921 0.6619 
 URI Servers 0.3804 0.5652 0.6250 0.4837 0.7446 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4834 0.7628 0.8687 0.5698 0.8077 0.8947 
Canada Clients Servers 0.1789 0.4494 0.6356 0.2010 0.4690 0.6520 
 Clients 0.2223 0.4710 0.6451 0.2492 0.4854 0.6621 
 URI Servers 0.3587 0.5543 0.6250 0.4565 0.7391 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4540 0.7572 0.8650 0.5482 0.8040 0.8950 
China Clients Servers 0.1837 0.4514 0.6353 0.2065 0.4705 0.6495 
 Clients 0.2305 0.4744 0.6440 0.2565 0.4883 0.6539 
 URI Servers 0.3641 0.5598 0.6304 0.4837 0.7391 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4683 0.7578 0.8634 0.5599 0.8049 0.8935 
India Clients Servers 0.1846 0.4538 0.6376 0.2071 0.4705 0.6511 
 Clients 0.2360 0.4815 0.6555 0.2613 0.4938 0.6632 
 URI Servers 0.3696 0.5598 0.6250 0.4783 0.7391 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4695 0.7603 0.8675 0.5599 0.8058 0.8947 
German Clients Servers 0.1833 0.4495 0.6346 0.2063 0.4707 0.6504 
 Clients 0.2277 0.4688 0.6378 0.2562 0.4870 0.6549 
 URI Servers 0.3641 0.5598 0.6359 0.4837 0.7446 0.8370 
 URI Clients 0.4667 0.7575 0.8631 0.5593 0.8055 0.8947 
UK Clients Servers 0.1801 0.4447 0.6356 0.2033 0.4655 0.6496 
 Clients 0.2244 0.4598 0.6459 0.2523 0.4738 0.6555 
 URI Servers 0.3587 0.5489 0.6250 0.4674 0.7228 0.8261 
 URI Clients 0.4556 0.7522 0.8650 0.5540 0.8002 0.8935 
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week from 02-10-2014 to 02-16-2014 when probability of transmission is 0.1. The 
chosen week is randomly selected from the 90-day data. The experiments are conducted 
on combined network with external network and 10% internal network to understand 
the infection spread by initiating infection with: (1) 100 unique random clients, (2) 100 
unique URI clients, (3) 100 unique China clients, and (4) 100 unique UK clients. The 
high number of data flows from China and UK could be explained by the significant 
number of students from China at URI and by URI’s collaboration with universities at 
UK. The results demonstrate rates of infection of URI clients higher than rates of URI 
servers. The days 02-15-2014 and 02-16-2014 are weekend and hence show less rates 
of infection, relative to the intensity of traffic. The graphs display expected pattern of 
rates of servers, clients and URI servers over the week when infection is initiated from 
four different sources. But rates of URI clients vary based on initiated source of 
infection. This analysis was not evident when rates were calculated for one day in 
Section 4.2. This particular observation has led us to the following hypothesis: that URI 
clients are more vulnerable to infection from various sources in this experiment. 
However, we would need the real internal communication traffic in order to analyze the 
behavior and vulnerability of URI clients. 
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Figure 9: Fraction of Infected Nodes on Combined Network: External + 10% Internal over the week 
between 02/10/2014 to 02/16/14 when p=0.1 
 
To understand further how the daily rates of infection change over time after an 
initial infection, we conduct experiments using the data collected over ninety-day period 
between February and May 2014. Figure 3 demonstrates the average activity of network 
nodes summarized separately for URI clients and servers. Figure 10 represents rates of 
infection estimated daily over ninety-day period. By comparing Figure 3 and Figure 10, 
one can notice that up until the middle of March, the estimated rates of infection 
followed the temporal weekly pattern consistent somewhat with the intensity of the 
traffic. For example, the fall in traffic intensity between 03/10/2014 to 03/14/2014 that 
can be explained due to spring break week at the university can be also observed in the 
estimated rates of infection. During the time period between 4/22/2014 to 5/6/2014 the 
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URI network was claimed to be under real cyber-attack explaining why data was not 
collected during this period. Remarkably, the intensity of node activity after the spring 
break and before the attack has not indicated any suspicious pattern; however, at the 
same time, the rates of infection for URI servers show clear departure from the expected 
behavior (Figure 10). This particular observation has led us to the following hypothesis: 
that the simulated infection rates that are not consistent with the intensity of the flow 
traffic may indicate the presence of compromised node activity and possible intrusion. 
The dependency that caused the abnormality could be hidden under certain 
characteristics of dynamic network that needs to be explored further (Refer Section 4.4).  
 





Figure 10: Fraction of Infected Nodes per day on Combined Network over the 90-day period. 
 
We have analyzed average of fraction of infected nodes per day in the week over 
90-days and Figure 11 depicts the results. The weekends show less activity and week 
days, specially the mid-week Thursdays show maximum rates of infection. On an 
average, the rates of infection show proportional pattern to intensity of traffic and grand 
average states that URI clients are more proven to infection at 31%, URI servers at 24%, 




Figure 11: Average of Fraction of Infected nodes on Combined Network for each day in the week over 
90-days when p=0.1 and initial infection starting from 100 Random clients. 
 
 
We have further analyzed infection propagation per week over the 90-day 
period. This analysis helps us to understand the infection spread, when infection 
propagation continues in the network through the week. The results demonstrate rates 
of infection of URI clients higher than rates of URI servers. In Figure 10, we could see 
normal activity with respect to rate of infection of servers, clients and URI clients, 
whereas the rate of infection of URI servers showed abnormal high during the 3/17/2014 
and 4/20/2014. Similar results can be seen in Figure 12 for weekly propagation analysis. 
 
 
Figure 12: Fraction of Infected nodes on Combined Network for infection spread weekly over the 90-




4.4 NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS OVER TIME 
We have focused on the network characteristics of internal traffic (10%) and 
combined network per day over the time period of 90 days in this section. Figure 13 
depicts the unique number of URI clients and URI servers in internal traffic and Figure 
14 represents the unique number of clients, servers, URI clients and URI servers in the 
combined network. However, the pattern of the number of nodes over the period is 
consistent with the intensity of the flow traffic.  
 
 





          Figure 14: Number of Clients, Servers, URI Clients & URI Servers in Combined Network. 
 
 
Degree of nodes: The degree of URI clients and URI servers in internal traffic 
(Figure 15) and degree of clients and servers in combined network (Figure 16) show a 
similar pattern to that of the intensity of the flow traffic, which makes it hard to predict 
the abnormality and dependency. Our initial findings show that internal traffic preserves 
the node degree and time pattern. 
 





Figure 16: Degree of Clients and Servers in Combined Network. 
 
Assortativity: Assortativity is a preference of nodes to attach to others that are 
similar in the network. Though the specific measure of similarity may vary, network 
theorists often examine assortativity in terms of a node's degree [1]. We can notice that 
the degree distribution of clients and servers (Figure 15, 16) followed the temporal 
weekly pattern consistent with the intensity of the traffic. But the assortativity pattern 
(Figure 17, 18) in internal and combined network shows high variability and an 
interesting pattern that is not consistent with the intensity of flow traffic.  
Technological and biological networks typically show disassortative mixing, or 
dissortativity, where high degree nodes tend to attach to low degree nodes [1]. Our initial 
findings validate that our University network is disassortative in nature, which can be 
explained by expected selective communication behavior pattern and heavy tailed 
distribution of nodes (Figure 8). But Figure 18 clearly depicts positive values of 
assortativity, making the network random or assortative. Assortativity of zero value 
indicates close to random connectivity, which is unusual for a University network. 
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Positive assortativity is even more unusual, as it would imply communication only 
between popular URI servers and very active clients. Remarkably, the intensity of node 
activity after the spring break and before the attack has not indicated any suspicious 
pattern; however, at the same time, the network structure alters and pattern of 
assortativity shows clear departure from the expected behavior (Figure 18). This 
particular observation may indicate the presence of compromised node activity and 
promising future direction to predict possible intrusion. 
 
Figure 17: Assotativity of Internal Network (10%). 
 
 




Clustering coefficient of nodes: The clustering coefficient is another property 
which is dependent on how the nodes are related in the network and based on the 
projection of network. The below graphs in Figure 19 and 20 depict global and local 
clustering coefficient of internal and combined networks, respectively. The local 
clustering coefficient of nodes shows a similar pattern to that of the intensity of the flow 
traffic, but the global clustering coefficient of servers shows interesting pattern that is 
not consistent with the traffic flow intensity. This may indicate compromised node 
activity and needs to be further investigated. 
 





Figure 20: Global and Local Clustering Coefficient of Clients and Servers in Combined Network. 
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In summary, this study presents epidemiological study of Web-based malware 
for university network with partially observed flow data. It offers a framework that helps 
to (a) represent the network flow data in a form of a bipartite graph, (b) model an internal 
university network traffic from the observed external flow data using with limited 
information and a set of simple assumptions; and (c) analyze the spread of infection 
with and with-out the simulated internal network. The proposed methodology confirms 
the fact that rates of infection are incomplete without internal network and motivates 
the collection of real internal university data traffic in future. Additionally, we 
introduced country based infection simulation for detection of university network 
behavior over infection flowing in from different countries with history of cyber-
attacks.  The rates of infection, however, on the network proved to be similar when 
infection starts with random clients of these countries. Overall, the results suggest higher 
rates of infection for client nodes compared to servers with maximum rates achieved 
when infection initiated randomly. At the same time, the results of a simulation 
experiment when infection starts from one active node from Denmark inspires further 
analysis in this direction. In addition, the daily analysis over a three-month period 
reveals that the simulated infection rates that are not consistent with the intensity of the 
traffic and the pattern of network characteristics which are dependent on how the nodes 
are related in the network, such as assortativity and global clustering coefficient, may 
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indicate the presence of compromised node activity and possible intrusion.  This finding 
would serve as promising future course of research.      
Finally, in this paper, we have considered the same probability of infection for 
clients and servers over time, whereas in reality clients and servers have variable 
protection and susceptibility levels, and classification of different nodes with different 
probabilities of infection is also in the future scope of research. Looking at some of the 
research works on disease spread and vaccination, the ideology of active and passive 
spread could be introduced to enhance the research further. Also, we intend to develop 





6.1 APPENDIX A: R CODE. 
 
# 1. Extracting all Servers and Clients  
serverList <- c () 
clientList <- c () 
 
## Read excel CSV: example dataset 03/27/2014 
flow  read.csv ("flows-131.128.5.84-2014-03-27.csv", header=T, as.is=T, sep=",", 
row.names = NULL)[,c(1,5,6,8,14,15)] 
IPAddress <- subset (flow, flow$application == "web-browsing") 
 
## Extract serverlist and clientlist 
serverList <- IPAddress$destination_address     
clientList <- IPAddress$source_address 
 
## Total number of unique clients and servers 
clienttotal <- length(unique(clientList))  
servertotal <- length(unique(serverList)) 
 
URIcltotal <- length (unique (clientList [grepl("^131.128", clientList)])) 
URIsrtotal <- length (unique (serverList [grepl("^131.128", serverList)])) 
 
## Generate a vector of random variables on [0,1] interval, the same length as the 
number of flows -Probability of infection transmission 
xinfectedList <- runif(nrow(IPAddress), min = 0, max = 1) 
 
## Create dataframe with - determined Client and Server List & Receive Time 
Comp_Net_Flow <- data.frame (ClientsIP = clientList, 
                            ServersIP = serverList,  
                            receive_time = IPAddress$receive_time,  
                            rxif = xinfectedList) 
 
## 2. Construction of Internal Network 
 
##Extract URI servers and clients using IP address starting with 131.128.X.X 
URI_clients <- clientList [grepl("^131.128", clientList)] 




## Consider all unique URI clients and servers; Sampling not required. 
URIclienttotal <- length (URI_clients)   
URIservertotal <- length (URI_servers)  
 
## Calculate the size (total data flows) for each Internal network 50%, 25% and 10% 
 
Random_10percent <- round (0.1 * nrow(Comp_Net_Flow))  
Random_25percent <- round (0.25 * nrow(Comp_Net_Flow))  
Random_50percent <- round (0.50 * nrow(Comp_Net_Flow))  
xinfectedList50 <- runif (Random_50percent, min = 0, max = 1) 
 
## Create 10% and 25% out of 50% of the data flows. 
Random_50_Flow <- data.frame 
(ClientsIP = sample (URI_clients, Random_50percent, replace=T), 
                         ServersIP = sample (URI_servers, Random_50percent, replace=T),  
                         receive_time = sample (IPAddress$receive_time, Random_50percent), 
                         rxif = xinfectedList50) 
 
Random_25_Flow <- Random_50_Flow [ 
sample(nrow(Random_50_Flow), Random_25percent), ] 
Random_10_Flow <- Random_25_Flow [ 
sample(nrow(Random_25_Flow), Random_10percent), ] 
 
## For External network: timestamp * 10 + vector(i) 1 to length 
Comp_Net_Flow$receive_time <- as.numeric 
(Comp_Net_Flow$receive_time) * 10+c (1:nrow (Comp_Net_Flow)) 
 
## For Internal network: timestamp * 10 + vector(i) 1 to length + 0.5 
Random_10_Flow$receive_time <- as.numeric 
(Random_10_Flow$receive_time) * 10+c (1:nrow (Random_10_Flow))+0.5 
Random_25_Flow$receive_time <- as.numeric 
(Random_25_Flow$receive_time) * 10+c (1:nrow (Random_25_Flow))+0.5 
Random_50_Flow$receive_time <- as.numeric 
(Random_50_Flow$receive_time) * 10+c (1:nrow (Random_50_Flow))+0.5 
 
## Complete list - adding external flow and internal flow 
web_flow_dly <- rbind.data.frame(Comp_Net_Flow,Random_10_Flow) 
 
## Sort(order) the data frame based on timestamp. 
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web_flow_dly <- web_flow_dly[order(web_flow_dly$receive_time),]  
 




## 3. Infection Propagation and Rate of Infection  
 
stochastic_infection <- function(p) 
{       
          infectedserverList <- c() 
          infectedclientList <- c() 
          infectedserverURIList <- c() 
          infectedclientURIList <- c() 
           
          ##counter variables nc[] and ns[] and for URI nodes ncuri[] and nsuri[] 
          nc <- c() 
          ns <- c() 
          ncuri <- c() 
          nsuri <- c() 
           
          ##infect randomly 100 clients. 
          #(i) Random 100 clients from netflow data 
          #(ii) Random 100 URI clients  
          #(iii) Random 100 Clients from Top Countries -- Canada China India UK 
   
            infectedclientList <-unique(clientList) 
[sample(length(unique(clientList)),100, replace=FALSE)] 
 
infectedclientList <- unique(URI_clients) 
[sample(length(unique(URI_clients)),100, replace=FALSE)] 
      
 countrylist <- (subset (IPAddress, (IPAddress$destination_port == 80 |   
IPAddress$destination_port == 443) & (IPAddress$source_country == 
"China"))) 
 infectedclientList <- unique(countrylist$source_address)   
[sample(length(unique(countrylist$source_address)),100,replace=)] 
           
          ##loop result: infected clients and server list 
          for (i in 1:nrow (web_flow_dly)){ 
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            if (is.element(web_flow_dly$ClientsIP[i], infectedclientList))  
            { 
              if(web_flow_dly$rxif[i] <= p) { 
                infectedserverList <- union (infectedserverList, web_flow_dly$ServersIP[i])  
              } 
           }   
            if (is.element (web_flow_dly$ServersIP[i], infectedserverList))  
            { 
              if(web_flow_dly$rxif[i] <= p) { 
                infectedclientList <- union (infectedclientList, web_flow_dly$ClientsIP[i]) 
              } 
            } 
 
            nc[i] <- length(infectedclientList) 
            ns[i] <- length(infectedserverList) 
            ncuri[i] <- length (infectedclientList[grepl("^131.128", infectedclientList)]) 
            nsuri[i] <- length (infectedserverList[grepl("^131.128", infectedserverList)]) 
             
            URI_infclients <- infectedclientList[grepl("^131.128", infectedclientList)] 
            URI_infservers <- infectedserverList[grepl("^131.128", infectedserverList)] 
         
          } 
return (list (infectedserverList, infectedclientList, ns/servertotal, nc/clienttotal, 
nsuri/URIsrtotal, ncuri/URIcltotal, URI_infservers, URI_infclients)) 
        } 
         
        ## 4. Parallel Computation using doparallel and foreach 
 
        library(doParallel) 
        library(foreach) 
         
        ## Numbers of cores in the system 
        no_cores <- detectCores() 
        ## Number of cluster - increase more than available cores or same. 
        cl<-makeCluster(no_cores-1) 
        ## To make the process parallel 
        registerDoParallel(cl) 
         
        ## Calling function in parallel for each of p based on different datasets  
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        totalp <- foreach (p = c(0.1, 0.3, 0.5)) %dopar% stochastic_infection(p) 
        stopCluster(cl) 
         
        ## Rate of Infection Calculation for total clients and servers 
        rateinf_clients_0.1 = length(totalp[[1]][[2]])/clienttotal 
        rateinf_servers_0.1 = length(totalp[[1]][[1]])/servertotal 
        rateinf_clients_0.3 = length(totalp[[2]][[2]])/clienttotal 
        rateinf_servers_0.3 = length(totalp[[2]][[1]])/servertotal 
        rateinf_clients_0.5 = length(totalp[[3]][[2]])/clienttotal 
        rateinf_servers_0.5 = length(totalp[[3]][[1]])/servertotal 
         
        ## Rate of Infection Calculation for URI clients and servers 
        URIrateinf_clients_0.1 = length(totalp[[1]][[8]])/URIcltotal 
        URIrateinf_servers_0.1 = length(totalp[[1]][[7]])/URIsrtotal 
        URIrateinf_clients_0.3 = length(totalp[[2]][[8]])/URIcltotal 
        URIrateinf_servers_0.3 = length(totalp[[2]][[7]])/URIsrtotal 
        URIrateinf_clients_0.5 = length(totalp[[3]][[8]])/URIcltotal 
        URIrateinf_servers_0.5 = length(totalp[[3]][[7]])/URIsrtotal 
         
#################################################################### 
##5. Network Characteristics 
 
# Create bipartite graph to explore characteristics  
IPTableuni = table(Random_Intr_Flow$ServersIP, Random_Intr_Flow$ClientsIP) 
IPuni = cbind(IPTableuni) 
graphuni <- as.matrix(IPuni) 
datauri <- graph.incidence(graphuni,multiple=T, mode= c("all", "out", "in", "total")) 
 
# Average degree of nodes 




# Assortativity of network 
assortativity_degree(datauri) 
 







Frequency"), main="Log-Log Degree Distribution") 
# Histogram 
hr <- as.numeric(Comp_Net_Flow$receive_time) 
hist(hr, main="Histogram for Frequency", xlab="Time", ylab="Freq", 
border="blue", col="grey", las=1, xaxt="n", breaks=100, prob = TRUE) 
axis(1, at=c(1,17000, 30000, 46000), labels= c("00:00 AM", "10:30 AM", "5:30 PM", 
"11:30 PM")) 
 
# Bipartite projection  
bi.proj <- bipartite.projection(datauri) 
server.net <- bi.proj$proj1 
client.net <- bi.proj$proj2 
 
# Global Clustering coefficient 
transitivity(client.net, type = "global") #Clients 
transitivity(server.net, type = "global") #Servers 
 
# Local Clustering coefficient 
data.cl <- transitivity(client.net, type = "local") #Clients 
mean(data.cl[which(data.cl != "NaN")])  
data.cl <- transitivity(server.net, type = "local") #Servers 
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